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Designing Natural Gas Distribution Concessions in a Megacity: Tradeoffs between 
Scale Economies and Information Disclosure in Mexico City* 
 
Introduction 
In 1995 the Mexican government initiated structural reform of  the natural gas sector—
reform that permitted private investment in transportation, storage, distribution, trade and 
marketing while maintaining a State monopoly in production. It prepared a detailed 
regulatory framework to implement the sector liberalization, including an element to 
develop distribution systems through concessions in specific geographic areas (Rosellón 
and Halpern 2000). The concessions are bid and the winner is permitted physical 
exclusivity for 12 years in gas distribution but not in gas marketing.
1 In each concession 
award process a distribution geographical area is defined and minimum consumer 
coverage targets are established. Bidders present technical and financial proposals, 
including a market demand study. The winning proposal must be technically sound and 
offer the lowest average revenue for the first five-year period.
2 
Densely populated geographic areas pose a problem for exclusivity in distribution. If the 
concession is granted to a single firm, scale economies might be very attractive, but 
regulating a “mega-monopoly” would be difficult. If the distribution area is subdivided, 
economies of scale decrease while information for comparative regulation increases. 
These and such elements as technical characteristics of the geographic area and potential 
for competition in related services were considered when designing natural gas 
distribution franchises for the Mexico City Metropolitan Area (ZMCM).  
Unit cost is the main variable related to scale of operation. Since natural gas distribution 
has natural monopoly characteristics, unit costs should fall as distribution franchise zones 
get bigger. An assessment was made as to how the partition of the ZMCM would affect 
the amount of information available to the regulator, the nature and magnitude of 
financial risk borne by the distributor, the scope for promoting competition in activities 
related to natural gas distribution, and the pace of build-out of the network. As the 
number of distribution franchise zones increases, so will competition and the speed of 
developing distribution systems—along with risk and uncertainty. Another element 
considered in the partition decision was the configuration of existing distribution 
infrastructure in the ZMCM and the areas with technical risk.  
                                                 
*    Several sections of this paper draw on and update the analysis contained in Juan Rosellon, editor, 
División Óptima de la Zona Metropolitana de la Ciudad de México para Fines de Dristribución de Gas 
Natural, Documento de Trabajo 121, CIDE, México. 
1 The Energy Regulatory Commission regulates distribution tariffs through average revenue yield price 
caps. In general, gas marketing inside the distribution area is not regulated because this activity is 
contestable. The distributor’s marketing subsidiary competes with other marketeers. When there is not 
enough competition either from marketeers or substitute fuels, the final price to the distributor’s captive gas 
buyers is regulated through an acquisition price methodology. See Rosellón (1998 a).  
2 Distributors that had a distribution concession prior to April 1995 are also incorporated to the permit 
regime.    
2 
Theoretical Framework 
Intuitively, more distribution franchise zones provide more information to regulate 
regional monopolies; fewer distribution franchise zones permit greater economies of 
scale. The optimal number of distribution franchise zones should reach an equilibrium 
between adequate information (to permit the regulator to optimize social welfare) and 
unit cost minimization.  
A fundamental problem for the regulator is lack of information on technological 
characteristics (and hence costs) of regulated firms. The firm can use this private 
information to increase strategic market power. Learning potential and the amount of the 
information available to the regulator grow as the number of distributors grows, because 
the regulator can compare the performance of each company (yardstick regulation). This 
comparison permits prices to reflect competitive costs and implies greater pressure for 
firms to behave efficiently (box 1).  
 
Box 1. Using Yardstick Regulation to Set Price Caps  
Yardstick regulation can be used to set a firm’s price cap as a function of the cost 
performance of another firm. Armstrong and others (1994) present a model of firms i and 
j that operate in independent markets and produce the same product. The authors assume 
that demand for the product is inelastic, and costs depend on information known only to 
the firm. But the regulator knows that the cost parameters of each firm are correlated. The 
regulator uses yardstick regulation to set a price cap for each firm so that the price of firm 
i is a function of the costs of firm j, because these costs reveal information on the effort 
level of firm i.  
The model finds that yardstick regulation works whenever there is a positive correlation 
between the cost uncertainty parameters of both firms. Only in this case is it sensible to 
make the price and effort of one firm depend on the costs of the other. If this result is 
applied to the case of partition of a distribution area, we see a correlation among the 
firms’ costs. It is therefore advisable to set the regulated price of one firm as a function of 
the performance of others. The greater information yielded by an increase in distribution 
franchise zones permits more efficiency in incentive regulation. The effort levels of 
regional monopolies are optimized because they depend on the performance of the other 
distribution franchise zones. 
Artificial yardsticks, or benchmarks, can also be constructed through cost models that 
control the behavior of certain variables. Models of this type have been used to compare 
gas delivery costs for different urbanization levels.  
 
Productive Efficiency: Unit Cost Analysis 
A natural monopoly has high sunk costs and a subadditive cost function. That is, a single 
firm faces lower costs than do multiple firms serving the same market. In such network  
3 
industries as natural gas distribution, spatial dimensions depend on the number and 
density of consumers and the size of the geographic area. 
Economies of scale are not infinite. If consumer density is too high, economies of scale 
will disappear as administrative costs rise. If economies of scale were never exhausted, 
the minimum pipeline delivery cost would be achieved by having a single distributor 
supply the whole market, regardless of the size of the geographic area.  
Distribution Costs. The costs of natural gas distribution are such that: 
•  Connection costs can decrease as the urban network develops but may increase with 
network congestion. 
•  It is cheaper to provide the distribution service to industrial consumers than to 
residential consumers, because capacity utilization of industrial consumers is greater 
and more uniform over time. 
•  The unit cost of connecting a consumer to the network increases with greater distance 
from the network.  
Therefore, the cost function of the distribution firm will be determined by input prices, 
volume throughput, the number of consumers and their geographic dispersion and 
consumption levels. Estimates of distribution costs for alternative partitions of the 
ZMCM were calculated using coefficients of a translog cost function
3 for the natural gas 
distribution market in the United States.  
The U.S. natural gas market was chosen as a cost and demand benchmark because of its 
abundance of relevant and reliable data on natural gas distribution systems in the country. 
Since the Mexican market is part of the North American market,
4 the U.S. local 
distribution companies are a relevant target model for Mexican local distribution 
companies in network development, service standards, and cost efficiency. And because 
the U.S. gas market is more mature than Mexico’s, the behavior of local distribution 
companies in the United States may foreshadow the behavior of those in Mexico. Thus 
the unit cost analysis for the ZMCM was presumed to be valid up to 2010. In other 
words, the proportion among unit costs in distinct distribution franchise zones was 
assumed to remain constant for 12 years.  
                                                 
3 The translog functional form has been widely used in studies on determining cost functions. It does not 
impose a priori restrictions on substitution possibilities among factors of production. It allows for variation 
in scale economies at different production levels, which is essential for the unit cost function to be U-
shaped. And due to its generality it has been shown to be superior to other functional forms used in applied 
research. See Christensen, Jorgensen, and Lau (1973).  
4 The price of natural gas in Mexico is determined through a regulatory formula based on the prices in 
south Texas (see Brito and Rosellón 1998). Moreover, the Mexican pipeline system is physically linked to 
the North American one also in south Texas.   
4 
The unit cost analysis also required estimating demand through 2010. The demand 
projections were then plugged into the cost function, and the effects on unit costs of 
different partitions of the ZMCM were evaluated.  
Demand for Natural Gas. There are two ways to analyze demand for energy products. 
Consumer theory is applied for residential users and small firms that do not use energy as 
an input in production. Demand depends on the price of the product as well as on prices 
of substitute and complementary products. The theory of production is applied for 
consumers that use energy as a production factor (industry, services). Demand depends 
on the price of natural gas and other potentially competing fuels and the prices of other 
inputs that can substitute for energy, such as capital and labor.  
Both approaches were used for Mexico. Demand was assumed to depend on prices of the 
above mentioned variables, a set of variables that measure purchasing power, and another 
set of variables that measure market conditions. As in the cost function, a translog 
demand function was used. The translog functional form was then modified to estimate 
future natural gas demand in Mexico. 
Coefficients of a translog demand function in the natural gas distribution market of the 
United States were estimated. The data from the resulting demand functions were then 
included in the estimations for the cost function of different partitions of the ZMCM. 
Likewise, several economic scenarios were developed in order to provide different values 
for demand and, consequently, different results for the unit costs associated with distinct 
partition options. 
Dimensioning a distribution geographic area also needs to consider the technical 
characteristics of the natural gas distribution franchise zone. In the ZMCM, some 
distribution infrastructure already existed. The ZMCM is also an earthquake area. 
 
Pre-existing Distribution Infrastructure. Before bidding began in April 1998 to grant 
exclusive distribution service in the ZMCM, the network was operated by a Petróleos 
Mexicanos (Pemex) subsidiary—Pemex Gas y Petroquímica Básica (PGPB)—and by 
Diganamex. PGPB’s network was 237 kilometers long, with branches 195 kilometers 
long and diameters of 10–36 inches. This network covered 312 industrial consumers and 
had two segments. The first connected producing fields to the city gate using three 
pipelines with a capacity of 300 million cubic feet a day.
5 The second connected the city 
gate to the rest of the consumers inside the ZMCM. This second segment was designed as 
a series of interconnected rings to provide flexibility in distribution (figure 1). Four rings 
in the north supplied industrial consumers; one ring in the south served residential 
consumers. The system operated at pressures of 13–24 kilograms per square centimeter. 
Its capacity was 190 million cubic feet a day, and distribution loads varied between 113 
million cubic feet a day and 138 million cubic feet a day. Available capacity was 52–77 
million cubic feet a day—enough to serve 900,000 consumers.  
                                                 
5 See the first three pipelines in the PGPB chart of figure 1.   
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1  24  51  Venta de Carpio–Chalco  
 14  29   
2  24  51  Venta de Carpio–Nonoalco 
3     Venta de Carpio–Chalco (cont.) 
4  22  76  Venta de Carpio–Camarones–San Pedro–Cuemanco–Chalco
 14     
 10     
5 14  3  Nonoalco–Camarones 
6 24  14  Altavilla–San  Pablo 
7  14  29  Venta de Carpio–Nonoalco (cont.) 
8  22  76  Venta de Carpio–Camarones–San Pedro–Cuemanco–Chalco 
(cont.) 
9  20  26  Venta de Carpio–Barrientos 
10  20  38  Venta de Carpio–Guanos–Romana–San Pablo I 
 12     
 14     
 
Diganamex 
a)  Jardines de Coapa 
Villa Coapa 
Alianza Pop. Rev. 
Culhuacán  
Villa Quietud 
b)  Pedregal de Carrasco 
Copilco Universidad 
Villa Olímpica  
c)  Lomas de Plateros 
Lomas Sotelo 
d)  Camarones 
Tlatelolco 




f) Reyes  Iztacala 
Cuautitlán Izcalli  
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Before 1998, Diganamex had the concession to operate 1,015 kilometers of distribution 
pipelines with diameters of 0.5 and 12 inches. It served 135,517 mostly residential 
consumers. 
Risk Areas. The urban growth of the ZMCM has taken place in the absence of a 
comprehensive urban land use plan and has harmed forests, soil, and the atmosphere. 
Moreover, the growth of human settlements on the city’s periphery, where there are 
adverse geological and hydrological conditions, increases risks. The main risks in the 
ZMCM are earthquakes, volcanic activity (the Popocatépetl and the Federal District’s 
southern transversal volcanic range), landslides of sedimentary material from hills, and 
areas prone to  flooding.
6 Any distribution project must consider Mexico City's 
susceptibility to earthquakes and other forms of geological instability.  
Other Elements: Financial Risk, Competition in Related Services, and Speed of 
Development 
Large distribution franchise zones—with an adequate mix of consumers—decrease the 
financial risks of operating distribution systems. As the number of distribution franchise 
zones that subdivide a distribution area decreases, financial risks may also decrease. As 
the number of distribution franchise zones increases, so does the financial impact of 
losing industrial consumers. If every distributor only had very few industrial consumers, 
demand in one of the distribution franchise zones may abruptly decrease if a large 
consumer went bankrupt or exited the market for other reasons. 
The possibility of reaching an adequate balance in the coverage of different types of 
consumers increases when the distribution franchise zones are large. A relatively 
extensive service region provides the distribution companies with more growth options. 
And the larger the service region, the lower the risk that unforeseeable or uncontrolled 
events (such as land subsidence and the discovery of archaeological sites) will decrease 
the distributor’s profits. These events will have less impact on financial performance if 
they affect a small part of the total operations of the company. 
The way the ZMCM is partitioned would also influence the promotion of competition in 
segments related to natural gas distribution, such as gas marketing and connecting new 
consumers to the distribution network. Competition is also feasible in reconversion 
services of equipment for the use of natural gas, maintenance and repair of equipment, 
and energy management services. Even though entry to these markets is open, 
distributors have experience in offering an ample variety of gas services and could extend 
distribution to these related markets. Since a distributor can efficiently offer these 
services, competition in these markets is promoted as the number of distributors increases 
and, consequently, when the number of distribution franchise zones is higher.  
                                                 
6 See Rosellón (1998b), annex 2, for a detailed description of the main risks for distribution franchise zones 
in the ZMCM.   
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Finally, since each potential distributor has a short-run coverage objective to generate 
profits, more area will be covered in less time as more distributors participate. In other 
words, the more distribution franchises there are, the faster the network will develop. 
Other Partition Experience 
Buenos Aires, Argentina, provides an example of how to grant infrastructure services 
concessions to the private sector. The distribution area was segmented before the network 
was privatized. The following criteria were employed: 
•  Cost minimization—the criterion was to minimize the cost of separating the systems. 
The mix of consumers and growth potential of resulting distribution franchise zones 
were not considered. 
•  Integrated network—to maintain system integrity and to be able to have more than 
one firm in the network, the methodology considered the pipeline systems as a single 
network. 
•  Number of distributors—economic  and commercial criteria were considered, as well 
as operational restrictions. 
The economic and commercial criteria were: 
•  Access to gas production.  
•  Access to markets.  
•  Condition of existing distribution infrastructure .  
•  Size of the distribution system (a comparison with U.S. local distribution companies 
was performed).  
•  Information flows for the regulator (benchmarking).  
•  Maximization of the potential value of each distribution subsystem (in terms of age of 
assets, physical expansion, and potential market growth).  
The only alternatives considered were two or three business units. Four or more units 
were shown to be unattractive because of operational restrictions and a small potential 
value of each distribution segment. Buenos Aires was divided into two concessions—the 
north, with 871,000 consumers and a development potential based on industrial 
consumers and growth of suburban areas; and the south, with 1.7 million consumers in 
the federal capital city and the rest of the metropolitan area. Its development potential is 
based on industrial and commercial clients, heating and air-conditioning systems, and 
auxiliary power plants.  
8 
Unit Cost Analysis of the ZMCM  
To demarcate the natural gas distribution area of Mexico City—in which one or more 
distribution franchises would be permitted to operate—physical characteristics and 
economic, political, and social transformation processes were considered.
7 Three 
demarcation options—Megalopolis, the Valley of Mexico, the ZMCM—were considered, 
and they all had the same distribution infrastructure (table 1).  




















Number of jurisdictions 
Megalopolis  23   Very low—due to 
distance 
16 “delegations”—Federal District. 
Metropolitan areas of Toluca, Cuernavaca, Puebla 
Tlaxcala, and Pachuca 





7 Isolated urban centres (Atlacomulco; Tepeapulco; 
Jilotepec-Tepeji-Tula; Tepozotlan-Huehuetoca-
Zumpango; Piramides-Nopaltepec; Texcoco and 
Chalco-Amecameca) 
The Valley of 
Mexico 
18.5 Low—due  to 
distance 
16 “delegations”—Federal District  
57 municipalities—State of Mexico  
1 municipality—Hidalgo 
The ZMCM  16  High—due to 
economic links 
and physical links 
(roads) 
16 “delegations”—Federal District (Mexico City) 
28 municipalities—State of Mexico 
 
 
The Megalopolis alternative was deemed too extensive and had insufficient economic 
links among towns and subregions. Population had more than doubled in the Valley of 
Mexico in 1970–95, posing a challenge for sewerage, drainage, electric power, and 
transportation systems. Diverse interests, local sovereignty, and the political 
characteristics of coordination among different jurisdictions have made the existence of 
two public administrations running the city (the Federal District and the State of Mexico) 
an obstacle to efficient urban development. The Valley of Mexico was considered too 
heterogeneous—economically, politically, and socially—to be a viable distribution area. 
                                                 
7 These criteria are described in Programa General de Desarrollo Urbano del Distrito Federal; Plan de 
Desarrollo del Estado de México 1993–1999; Programas Delegacionales de Desarrollo Urbano; Planes 
de los Centros de Población Estratégico de los Municipios del Estado de México; Propuestas de Divisiones 
del Área Metropolitana de la Ciudad de México (Secretaría de Desarrollo Social, Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística, Geografía e Informática); and Planes y Programas Gubernamentales.   
9 
The ZMCM covers 471,383 hectares and comprises 16 delegations of the Federal District 
(148,331 hectares) and 28 suburban municipalities of the State of Mexico (323,052 
hectares) (figure 2). In 1995 the ZMCM had about 16 million inhabitants—55 percent 
live in the Federal District, 45 percent in the State of Mexico. Demographics shifted 
between 1980 and 1990 as the relative participation of people in the Federal District 
decreased and relative participation of people in the State of Mexico increased. The 
ZMCM has historically been economically, culturally, and socially homogeneous. 
Moreover, common streets, roads, and highways connect all of its regions. So, despite the 
lack of a common public administration, the ZMCM was considered the best alternative 
for a natural gas distribution area. 

































Suburban municipalities of the State of Mexico 
1.  Acolman  8.  Cuautitlán Izcalli  15.  Melchor Ocampo  22. Tepotzotlán 
2.  Atenco  9.  Chimalhuacán  16.  Naucalpan  23. Texcoco 
3. Atizapán  de 
Zaragoza 
10.  Ecatepec  17.  Nezahualcóyotl  24. Tlalnepantla 
4.  Chalco  11.  Huixquilucan  18.  Nextlalpan  25. Tultepec 
5.  Chicoloapan  12.  Ixtapaluca  19.  Nicolás Romero  26. Tultitlán 
6. Coacalco 
 
13.  Jaltenco  20.  Tecamac  27. Valle de Chalco 
Solidaridad 
7.  Cuautitlán  14.  La Paz  21.  Teoloyucan  28.  Zumpango 
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Estimation of Unit Costs 
After selecting the ZMCM as the distribution area, unit cost analysis for the U.S. natural 
gas distribution market was conducted as a proxy for estimating the unit costs of 
distribution in the ZMCM. Since the distribution market in the ZMCM is not as mature as 
the market in the United States, the partition for the ZMCM was to be optimized for the 
year 2010.  The unit cost analysis for the ZMCM required demand projections for 2010, 
which could be derived from demand estimates for the U.S. natural gas distribution 
market. The unit cost analysis had four elements: 
1.  A cost function was estimated for the U.S. natural gas distribution market. 
2.  A demand function was estimated for the U.S. natural gas distribution market. 
3.  Coefficients of the demand function were used to forecast both number of consumers 
and volume of demand in the natural gas distribution market of the ZMCM in the 
year 2010. Demand projections were also made based on technical and market 
characteristics of the ZMCM. 
4.  Coefficients of the cost function were used to forecast unit costs for a given demand 
and for several alternative partitions of the ZMCM. 
The first element used a general translog cost function (Rosellón 1998b). Explanatory 
variables for unit costs included price of labor, price of capital, price of other inputs, 
volume demanded, number of consumers, area of service, and a time trend variable (table 
A1).  
The second was carried out using a translog demand function for each type of consumer 
(residential, commercial, and industrial). For each group, demand was estimated 
according to the number of users with natural gas delivery service (access demand) and 
consumed volume. Since there are three types of consumers and two types of demand, a 
total of six equations were estimated (Rosellón 1998b). In all these equations explanatory 
variables included wholesale natural gas prices for each type of consumer, price of 
electricity, and price of hydrocarbon substitutes. Prices of labor and capital were also 
included in the industrial demand equations.
8  
The results of estimating demand in the U.S. distribution market show that:
9  
•  The number of families explains demand for access from residential and commercial 
consumers. 
                                                 
8 Other variables employed included number of families and personal income (measuring purchasing 
power), number of days a year when heating is required (measuring seasonal demand), and such qualitative 
variables as environmental policies that promote the use of natural gas, presence of energy intensive 
industry, and distance from gas fields and pipelines serving the area. A time trend variable was also 
included to reflect long-term energy demand and the impact of relevant market variables that were not 
explicitly included in the analysis.  
9 Results for industrial demand are not presented because they were not statistically significant.   
11 
•  Demand for heating does not explain demand for access from residential consumers 
but it does explain demand for volume. 
•  Commercial volume demand is more elastic than residential volume demand. 
•  Industrial volume demand is more elastic than residential and commercial volume 
demands. 
•  There is an effect of substitution of capital and labor for energy in industrial volume 
demand (tables A2–A6). 
Before the parameters estimated in the first two steps were used to estimate the number 
of consumers and volume of delivered gas in the ZMCM for 2010, the specification of 
variables used in the demand model pertinent to Mexico City were verified. All such 
variables were deemed appropriate with one exception. At the residential and commercial 
levels the principal substitute for natural gas in the United States is distillate fuel; in 
Mexico it is liquid petroleum gas.  
Projections were needed for explanatory variables of demand for natural gas. Projections 
were made for temperatures, fuel oil consumption, energy prices, household income, 
urban territory, population and housing infrastructure, and prices of capital and labor. 
Forecasts for these variables were performed by using reference projections from the 
United States, long-run trends for Mexico, and distinct scenarios based on recent 
experiences (Rosellón 1998b). 
Once projections for the explanatory variables were obtained, demand for the natural gas 
distribution market of the ZMCM was estimated for 2010. Thirteen scenarios were run; 
each controlled for variations in population and economic growth, energy prices, and 
capital costs (table 2).  
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%  change 
from base 
scenario 
1. Base  scenario  1,965,526   6,980   
2. Fast  population  growth
a   2,635,320 34.1  7,131  2.2 
3. Fast  economic  growth
b   1,965,526 0.0  7,415  6.2 
4. Economic  stagnation
c   1,965,526 0.0  6,437  –7.8 
5.  20 percent decrease in national gas prices   1,992,651 1.4  7,890  13.0 
6.  20 percent decrease in liquid petroleum gas prices   1,917,140 –2.5  6,932  –0.7 
7.  20 percent decrease in electric tariffs   1,894,425 –3.6  6,379  –8.6 
8.  20 percent increase in natural gas prices  1,939,496 –1.3  6.230  –10.7 
9.  20 percent increase in liquid petroleum gas prices  2,008,602 2.2  7,025  0.6 
10. 20 percent increase in electric tariffs   2,051,169 4.4  7,617  9.1 
11. Constant fuel oil prices  1,965,526 0.0  5,691  –18.5 
12. Moderate increase in fuel oil prices   1,965,526 0.0  6.357  –8.9 
13. Convergence of Mexican and U.S. capital prices  1,965,526 0.0  6,134  –12.1 
a. 25 percent more than in the base scenario.  
b. 1 percent more than in the base scenario.  
c. Zero growth rate.  
 
This comparative analysis indicated that the demand model provided a reasonable 
explanation of natural gas demand in Mexico. Furthermore, the base scenario could be 
used with confidence because the inelastic behavior of demand suggests that results from 
the demand equation are not so sensitive to measurement precision in the explanatory 
variables.  
In parallel, demand was estimated using criteria for the technical and market conditions 
of the ZMCM. This scenario, termed the optimistic scenario predicts higher average daily 
consumption, more consumers, and lower average costs for the ZMCM (tables A7 and 
A8). The discrepancy comes from the base scenario’s assumption that a certain 
proportion of residential consumers can opt to use liquid petroleum gas instead of natural 
gas. Likewise, the average consumption of 1.85 cubic meters a day in the base scenario is 
obtained from the ratio of total volume to consumers. The optimistic scenario projects the 
number of residential consumers first according to demographic and engineering data, 
and proposes an expected consumption of 2.0 cubic meters a day. This is multiplied by 
the number of consumers to calculate total volume.  
 The calculation of demand by consumer class was used to estimate natural gas 
distribution costs for several hypothetical symmetric and non-symmetric partitions of the 
ZMCM. In the symmetric case the ZMCM was divided into five distribution franchise 
zones with the same number of clients, the same volume of delivered gas, and the same 
amount of urban territory. This was deemed unrealistic because it assumed that load and 
all other variables are uniformly distributed. The next step was to account for 
heterogeneity in population density and load characteristics by using non-symmetric 
partitions with a roughly balanced distribution of different types of consumers in each 
zone (figure 3).   
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Northern urban municipalities, southwestern urban 
municipalities and the western part of the Federal District, and 
southeastern urban municipalities and the eastern part of the 
Federal District 
Zone 1
Zone 2 Zone 3
 
 














Eastern and western Federal District, Eastern, Western, and 












The lowest unit cost is obtained when the complete ZMCM is a single distribution 
franchise zone. In the case of two perfectly symmetric distribution franchise zones there 
is a cost 3–6 percent higher than that of a single distribution franchise zone. With five 
symmetric distribution franchise zones there is an additional cost of approximately 27–37 
percent. That is, each additional distribution franchise zone increases unit costs  
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exponentially as the scale of operations shrinks. The symmetric partition confirms that 
the average cost of production progressively increases as the number of distribution 
franchise zones increases.  
In the case of nonsymmetric partitions, the lowest costs per volume were empirically 
obtained under the optimistic scenario (Rosellón 1998b). There is a direct relation 
between unit cost and the number of distribution franchise zones defined for the ZMCM. 
That is, fewer distribution franchise zones mean a lower unit cost in each zone (figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. Variation in Average Unit Cost as Number of Distribution Zones Rises  
One Two Three Four Five





The data indicate that even with similar estimated volumes of operations, unit costs vary 
considerably with more distribution franchise zones. The design of distribution franchise 
zones is therefore an important determinant of unit costs of operation. Of the options 
considered, the one that corresponds to the Federal District and urban municipalities 
shows the lowest cost differences compared with other partition options and the lowest 
difference with respect to the single-distribution franchise zone option.  
Synthesis of Decision Criteria 
The different options for partitioning the ZMCM were evaluated according to four 
criteria: 
•  Static economic efficiency. 
•  Promotion of competition—speed of development of the system, scope for 
benchmarking among distributors, and competition in related services. 
•  Technical efficiency. 
•  Financial risks to the operator.  
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The first two criteria imply lower total operating costs and thus lower tariffs for 
consumers. Promotion of competition implies a fast start in extending distribution service 
and in providing related services such as connection, metering, reconversion, 
maintenance and repair of equipment, gas marketing, and energy management services. 
Creating geographic distribution franchise zones requires balancing these criteria with the 
financial risk criterion.  
More distribution franchise zones implied more information for comparative regulation, 
greater competition in related services, and faster development of the distribution 
network. Taken together, these considerations militated for partitioning the ZMCM into 
more than one distribution franchise zone.  
Concerning technical efficiency, restrictions on the use of the existing distribution 
network influenced the partition decision. The ZMCM’s distribution infrastructure is 
composed of two main rings (one for the Federal District, one for urban municipalities) 
and remains valuable as long as the design of the rings is maintained. The ring design 
preserves the integrity of the system, increases security of supply, and eases design and 
operation of the new pipeline network. The options that preserved the configuration of 
the existing network were those that corresponded to the Federal District and urban 
municipalities, and to the Northwest and Southeast options. The other alternatives would 
have required breaking the integrity of pre-existing infrastructure, diminishing its value.  
Financial risks to the operator increase as the number of distribution franchise zones 
increases. The effects of losing large (anchor) consumers and of unforeseeable events are 
greater when the distribution franchise zones are smaller and more numerous. Likewise, 
the distributor can better manage growth in demand in large zones because the mix of 
residential, commercial, and industrial consumers tends to be more balanced. Thus:  
•  A single distribution franchise zone implies a maximum value for the economic and 
technical efficiency criteria. It also reduces financial risk but is weaker on promotion 
of competition.  
•  Two distribution franchise zones incorporate competition criteria, imply a marginal 
increase in unit costs and financial risk, and can maximize the value of existing 
infrastructure. 
•  Three or more distribution franchise zones considerably increase unit costs and 
financial risk, lead to unbalanced distribution of the different types of consumers, 
complicate the transfer of infrastructure, but introduce more competition elements. 
•  In the Federal District and urban municipalities option, unit costs of operation for 
each distribution franchise zone are near their minimum value, implying the lowest 
tariffs for consumers. 
•  In this option and the East-West option, the geographic distribution franchise zones 
are defined homogeneously by mixture of consumers (residential, commercial, and  
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industrial) and potential operating volume. This would permit each distribution 
franchise zone to realize economies of scale and scope that attract investor interest.  
•  In the Federal District–urban municipalities and Northwest-Southeast options, it is 
technically feasible to define distribution assets that will be transferred to each private 
distributor. 
•  In the Federal District–urban municipalities option, the selection of distribution 
franchise zone coincides with political jurisdictions. 
This assessment suggested that the Federal District–urban municipalities option was the 
best. This was supported by consultations with interested public and private parties.
10 
Consultations centered on three issues: the viability of each partition option, the 
desirability of promoting competition in related services, and making best use of the 
existing distribution infrastructure. The consultations revealed that the two distribution 
franchise zones presented different conditions. The Federal District has less potential for 
growth and greater development complexity. But it has greater population concentration 
and potential to generate positive net cash flows in the short term. The urban 
municipalities of the State of Mexico have better potential for expansion, pose less 
difficulties for construction, and cover a larger area. It was also stressed that specific 
interconnection agreements should be negotiated when part of the infrastructure that is 
relevant for one distributor lies in the zone of the other distributor.  
Results to Date 
Unlike other privatizations in Mexico, in the natural gas distribution bids the government 
only establishes the number of consumers that must be covered at the end of the first five 
years. When applicable, it sets the value of the preexisting distribution facilities to be 
acquired by the winning bidder. It also requires that two-thirds of total investment must 
be financed by capital owned by the firm; restricting debt financing to one-third. These 
features, together with the specifics of the regulatory framework (such as the average 
revenue methodology used to regulate distribution tariffs) and the technical 
characteristics of the project, define the allocation of risk for distribution activities and 
how they may be financed (Rosellón and Halpern 2000). The terms and conditions, 
operation and maintenance obligations, service standards, and other obligations are set by 
the Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE) at the outset of the tender process. The market 
study presented by the winning bidder defines the coverage goals, tariffs, volumes, and 
investment commitments. Service standards are defined in official Mexican standards 
(NOMs) and relevant international standards. The final price to consumers is regulated by 
the acquisition price methodology (Rosellón and Halpern 2000).  
                                                 
10 Parties to the consultations included, among others Asociación Mexicana de Gas Natural (AMGN), 
Controladora Comercial e Industrial, Gaz de France, Gaz Metropolitain, Gobierno del Distrito Federal, 
Gobierno del Estado de México, Gutsa-Noram-Transcanada Pipelines, Pacific Enterprises International, 
Pemex Gas y Petroquímica Básica, Repsol México, and Tribasa.   
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Because the minimum number of consumers to be served at the end of the first five years 
of operation is the principal award criterion, the local distribution companies have an 
incentive to expand the network to connect as many consumers as possible.
11 This 
implies extending the distribution network quickly despite the inconvenience to the 
public. The bidding criteria therefore provided a strong incentive to start building the 
network in high-density areas—as opposed to a looped network that could grow in a 
more gradual, less disruptive fashion—in order to comply with minimum consumer 
coverage obligations.  
The bidding package for the ZMCM distribution concessions contained the minimum 
coverage required by the regulator: 350,000 consumers in the Federal District and 
300,000 in the State of Mexico at the end of five years. The CRE was also expecting $1 
billion in investment commitments (CRE 1998). The winning bids ended up with 
coverage commitments of almost 440,000 consumers in the Federal District and 370,000 
in the State of Mexico after five years, and $0.5 billion in investment after 10 years.  
The winning bidders were Comercializadora Metrogas (Metrogas) for the Federal District 
and Consorcio Maxi-Gas (Maxigas) for the State of Mexico. They received their permits 
on September 14, 1998. Metrogas was originally a consortium formed by Grupo Diavaz 
(15 percent), Lone Star Gas International (70 percent), and Controladora Comercial e 
Industrial (15 percent).
12 Maxigas is a consortium of Gaz de France (75 percent) and 
Buffete Industrial (25 percent).  
Metrogas’ average revenue cap of $2.42 per gigacalorie is higher than the national 
average of $1.49. Maxigas’ average revenue cap is lower than the average, and its typical 
monthly bill for a residential consumer ($74.58) also is below the national average. In 
fact, Maxigas maintained the same tariffs for existing and new industrial consumers. 
Metrogas’ existing industrial consumers pay more than new ones, partly because the 
Metrogas distribution network has conducted lower volume than the Maxigas network. 
Nevertheless, Metrogas paid about $72 million for the existing PGPB/Diganamex 
pipeline infrastructure; Maxigas paid about $94 million.  
Gas Contracts 
Gas supply contracts for Metrogas and Maxigas are arranged according to Pemex’s 
general terms and conditions for firsthand sales and CRE’s recently published directive 
on firsthand sales (CRE 2000; Rosellón and Halpern 2000). Pemex offers different kinds 
of supply gas contracts at the processing plant and the delivery point, as well as long-term 
contracts and forward or futures contracts. Regulated by the CRE, these contracts include 
firm, interruptible, spot, tunnel, and volumetric modalities.  
                                                 
11 The other criterion is the lowest average revenue.  
12 In March 2000 the Metrogas consortium was reconstituted. It now comprises Grupo Diavaz (14.7 
percent) and the Spanish companies Grupo Cantábrico (42.65 percent) and Gas Natural de México (42.65 
percent).   
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Investors’ Perceptions after Two Years  
In the two years since the distribution franchises were granted, unforeseen institutional 
problems have hindered network development. Managers of the ZMCM local distribution 
companies report that the CRE’s forecasts of demand growth and economic growth were 
too optimistic, and that market size and consumption levels were lower than predicted. 
The managers also believe that the value of the PGPB/Diganamex system was 
overestimated given the condition of pipelines, and that security and safety measures 
need to be stricter than those indicated by regulations and NOMs  
Managers of the ZMCM local distribution companies also report that acquisition price 
regulation has been unable to control cross subsidies by distributors. This assertion can be 
analyzed in more detail since regulators have approved prices for imported gas in such 
northern distribution systems as Mexicali, which imports gas from western North 
America basin; Ciudad Juárez, which imports gas from New Mexico (Permian Basin). A 
typical monthly bill in Mexicali ($84.42) is less than Mexico’s national average 
($107.68), and the gas price in Ciudad Juárez is above the national average. This provides 
some evidence that the acquisition price methodology, which the CRE has applied 
through national benchmarks, has been able to moderate cross subsidies.  
Several unanticipated operational problems have also emerged. Authorities in the Federal 
District and the State of Mexico require that excavations for pipeline installations be 
performed with “directional drilling” to minimize inconvenience to city dwellers and 
traffic. This is particularly difficult in the ZMCM because there is little mapping of 
underground water and cables systems in the distribution franchise zone. The only 
practical solution is the “open trench” method, which, causes disruption of traffic and 
other services.  Both distribution companies report that a March agreement between the 
CRE and the Federal District states that pipes may be installed through open trenches, 
with the exception of important streets and avenues where directional drilling will be 
used. 
Additionally, liquid petroleum gas–related explosions in Guadalajara in 1992 and Mexico 
City in 1985 have made Mexicans wary of gas pipelines. Both Metrogas and Maxigas are 
struggling to educate users about the benefits and safety of natural gas.  
Local distribution companies in the ZMCM also perceive a lack of coordination among 
the CRE, the Federal Competition Commission, and the Federal Consumer Agency 
regarding cross subsidies between industrial and residential consumers. There are also 
problems in the coordination among government agencies in implementing regulation:  
•  Pemex interference with granting of rights of way for private distribution pipelines 
that pass near PEMEX oil pipelines. This is being handled through meetings among 
the Ministry of Energy, the CRE, and Pemex legal counsels. If they do not resolve the 
problem, the next step is an executive decree.  
•  Two entities of the Ministry of Environment—the National Ecology Institute and the 
National Water Commission—are working on an arrangement with the CRE to  
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simplify the requirements and procedures that local distribution companies must 
meet. The Water Commission already has an agreement to facilitate pipeline 
crossings with rivers and waterlines. The Ministry of Transportation will also 
participate in these arrangements. 
•  The existence of specific local regulations has required coordination of the federal 
regulatory authorities and the local authorities. The Ministry of Energy, Ministry of 
Environment, Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Social Development, and the 
CRE are working to establish specific agreements of coordination with the states and 
municipalities. The purpose of these agreements is to simplify regulatory procedures 
and educate the public on the natural gas industry.  
Future Issues 
The first tariff review for the ZMCM is scheduled for 2003. A basic concern is whether 
and how Maxigas and Metrogas may seek to renegotiate the low tariffs upon which the 
concessions were awarded. The CRE is preparing for the first tariff review by 
constructing national and international benchmarks.   
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Appendix 
Table A1. Results of the Estimation of the Translog Cost Function 

















PL 0.251  0.004  71.43    PON  0.040  0.009  4.58 
PLPL  0.012  0.011 1.06    POA 0.009  0.002 4.25 
PLPK –0.011  0.012  –0.95    POT  0.003  0.001  3.73 
PLPO –0.012  0.011  –1.06    V  0.60  0.039  1.55 
PLV –0.053  0.010  –5.20    VV  0.021  0.112  0.19 
PLN 0.048  0.010  5.08    VN  –0.124  0.105  –1.19 
PLA  0.000  0.002 0.12    VA  0.018  0.024 0.77 
PLT  –0.001  0.009 –1.12    VT  –0.012  0.003 –3.72 
PK 0.596  0.005  115.48    N 0.800  0.079  10.13 
PKPK –0.088  0.016 –5.60    NN  0.386  0.124  3.10 
PKPO 0.099  0.010 9.94    NA  0.011  0.032 0.34 
PKV  0.098  0.015 6.55    NT  0.007  0.004 1.81 
PKN –0.088  0.014  –6.30    A  0.029  0.024  1.23 
PKA –0.009  0.003  –2.78    AA  0.028  0.012  2.22 
PKT  –0.002  0.001 –1.55    AT  –0.001  0.001 –0.82 
PO  0.153  0.003 47.60    T  –0.003  0.002 –1.39 
POPO –0.098  0.013 –7.70    TT  0.001  0.001  2.40 
POV –0.045  0.009  –4.83    Constant  12.164  0.067  180.24 
Variables: PL = price of labor, PK = price of capital, PO = price of other inputs, V = volume, N = number of 
consumers, A = area of the service territory (squared miles), T = time trend.  
Each parameter value can be interpreted as the percentage change in unit costs due to a 1 percent increase of each 
explicative variable, when the value of rest of the variables remains constant. Confidence level: 95 percent. 
Source: Energy Regulatory Commission.  
 
 
Table A2. Residential Consumers of Natural Gas,  













Constant –0.094  –1.42    PO  0.108  2.24 
H  1.236 6.30    POPO  0.061 0.31 
HH  0.084 0.60    POPE  0.179 1.12 
HPG –0.057 –1.32    POZ  0.145  2.33 
HPO 0.086 2.33    POT 0.027 2.73 
HPE  0.057 0.91    PE  0.144 1.93 
HZ  0.089 1.20    PEPE  0.328 1.66 
HT –0.001  –0.43    PEZ 0.071  0.49 
PG  –0.060 –1.02    PET  –0.019 –2.01 
PGPG –0.042  –0.20    Z  0.099  1.18 
PGPO  0.157 0.90    ZZ  0.135 1.45 
PGPE –0.179  –1.17    ZT  0.010  2.61 
PGZ  0.053 0.54    T  0.002 0.53 
PGT  0.015 1.63    TT  0.003 3.43 
Variables: H = number of families, PG = price of natural gas, PO = price of fuel oil, PE = price of electricity, 
Z = days of demand for heating, T = time trend. 
Each parameter value can be interpreted as the percentage change in unit costs due to a 1 percent increase of each 
explicative variable, when the value of the rest of the variables remains constant. Confidence level: 95 percent. 
Source: Energy Regulatory Commission.   
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Table A3. Natural Gas Residential Volume, 













Constant  0.028 0.63    PGPO  0.055 0.45 
N  0.193 1.57    PGPE  0.263 2.79 
NN –0.528  –6.00    PGZ 0.123  1.96 
NI  0.380 4.46    PGT 0.008 1.19 
NPG –0.122 –2.83    PO  0.070  2.06 
NPO 0.047 1.19    POPO  0.024 0.20 
NPE 0.078  1.35    POPE  –0.085  –0.85 
NZ  0.004 0.07    POZ 0.069 1.78 
NT –0.007  –2.44    POT 0.004  0.64 
I  0.528 5.07    PE  0.027 0.49 
II  –0.321 –2.98    PEPE  –0.201 –1.61 
IPG 0.149  2.82    PEZ  –0.181  –1.96 
IPO  –0.030 –0.65    PET  –0.001 –0.17 
IPE –0.173 2.20    Z  0.646  12.64 
IZ  0.002 0.04    ZZ  0.243 4.05 
IT  0.011 3.19    ZT  0.008 3.22 
PG  –0.157 –3.97    T  –0.003 –1.13 
PGPG –0.431  –2.71    TT  0.002  2.14 
Variables: N = number of consumers, I = total revenue, PG = price of natural gas, PO = price of fuel oil, 
PE = price of electricity, Z = days of demand for heating, T = Time trend. 
Each parameter value can be interpreted as the percentage change in unit costs due to a 1 percent increase of each 
explicative variable, when the value of rest of the variables remains constant. Confidence level: 95 percent. 
Source: Energy Regulatory Commission.  
 
 
Table A4. Commercial Consumers of Natural Gas,  













Constant –0.013  –0.11    PO  0.130  1.90 
H 1.159  3.14    POPO  –0.194  –0.59 
HH  –0.609 –2.36    POPE  –0.151 –0.58 
HPG –0.030 –0.36    POZ  0.002  0.02 
HPO 0.060 1.12    POT 0.002 0.09 
HPE –0.025  –1.18    PE  0.151 0.91 
HZ  0.028 0.20    PEPE  1.141 2.77 
HT 0.000  –0.02    PEZ  0.445  1.63 
PG  –0.162 –1.48    PET  –0.037 –2.06 
PGPG –0.209  –0.49    Z  0.181  1.16 
PGPO  0.470 1.65    ZZ  0.093 0.55 
PGPE –0.316  –1.00    ZT  0.011  1.61 
PGZ –0.186  –1.04    T  0.020 3.28 
PGT 0.071  3.41    TT –0.005  –2.86 
Variables: H = number of families, PG = price of natural gas, PO = price of fuel oil, PE = price of electricity, 
Z = days of demand for heating, T = time trend. 
Each parameter value can be interpreted as the percentage change in unit costs due to a 1 percent increase of each 
explicative variable, when the value of rest of the variables remains constant. Confidence level: 95 percent. 
Source: Energy Regulatory Commission.   
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Table A5. Natural Gas Commercial Volume, 













Constant  –0.184 –1.35    PGPO  –0.005 –0.02 
N 0.714  2.85    PGPE  –0.321  –1.01 
NN  0.584 2.79    PGZ 0.013 0.07 
NI  –0.444 –1.83    PGT –0.077 –2.91 
NPG 0.634 3.57    PO  0.157 2.07 
NPO 0.095 0.87    POPO  0.453 1.35 
NPE  –1.189 –4.70    POPE  –0.050 –0.19 
NZ –0.398  –2.26    POZ 0.161  1.80 
NT  –0.036 –4.44    POT –0.001 –0.06 
I –0.398  –1.36    PE  0.206  1.22 
II  –0.395 1.42    PEPE  0.175 0.36 
IPG  –0.550 –2.76    PEZ  –0.044 –0.15 
IPO –0.049  –0.43    PET 0.027 1.32 
IPE  1.099 3.63    Z  0.775 4.80 
IZ  0.209 1.04    ZZ  0.620 3.19 
IT  0.034 3.76    ZT  0.012 1.72 
PG –0.537  –4.64    T  0.016  1.92 
PGPG 1.133  1.98    TT  –0.001 –0.24 
Variables: N = number of consumers, I = total revenue, PG = price of natural gas, PO = price of fuel oil, 
PE = price of electricity, Z = days of demand for heating, T = time trend.  
Each parameter value can be interpreted as the percentage change in unit costs due to a 1 percent increase of each 
explicative variable, when the value of rest of the variables remains constant. Confidence level: 95 percent. 
Source: Energy Regulatory Commission.  
 
 
Table A6. Natural Gas Industrial Volume, 













Constant  0.079 1.16    POPE  0.143 0.60 
N  0.119 2.23    POW 0.528 0.84 
NN –0.074  –2.42    POK 0.163  0.26 
NPG –0.064 –1.14    POT –0.094 –2.06 
NPO –0.054 –1.33    PE  0.500  3.04 
NPE  0.177 2.56    PEPE  0.432 1.57 
NW 0.513  1.55    PEW  –0.363  –0.33 
NK  0.166 2.45    PEK 0.210 0.61 
NT –0.033  –2.44    PET 0.061  1.26 
PG –0.549  –4.40    W  4.097  1.79 
PGPG –0.533  –2.73    WW  10.095  1.72 
PGPO 0.257  0.89    WK  –0.391 –0.38 
PGPE  0.324 1.22    WT –0.389  –1.62 
PGW  –1.738 1.94    K  0.308 1.46 
PGK –0.434 –1.33    KK  0.943  0.42 
PGT  0.144 3.31    KT  0.026 0.38 
PO 0.234  2.47    T –0.150  –1.60 
POPO  0.159 0.32    TT  0.028 2.44 
Variables: N = number of consumers, PG = price of natural gas, PO = price of fuel oil, PE = price of electricity, 
Z = days of demand for heating, T = time trend. 
Each parameter value can be interpreted as the percentage change in unit costs due to a 1 percent increase of each 
explicative variable, when the value of rest of the variables remains constant. Confidence level: 95 percent. 
Source: Energy Regulatory Commission.  
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Table A7.  Projected Demand for Natural Gas in 2010  
  Volume (M3/day)  
 
Number of  
users 
Average consumption  
(M3/day/ user) 
  Conservative   Optimistic   Conservative  Optimistic   Conservative   Optimistic  
Residential  3,323,906 5,307,775 1,754,949 2,653,888  1.89  2.00 
Commercial 1,396,554 1,576,064  195,577  78,803  7.14  20.00 
Industrial  14,403,696  26,799,751 15,000 31,716  960.25 844.99 
Total 19,124,157  33,683,590  1,965,526  2,764,407  9.73  12.18 
 
 
Table A8. Annual Average Costs of Distribution in Symmetric Zones  




  Per user  
(US$) 
 
    Conservative  Optimistic     Conservative  Optimistic    
 1  82.51  66.29    293.04  294.81   
 2  87.46  68.09    310.59  302.84   
 3  95.54  73.04    339.28  324.82   
 4  104.22  78.65    370.13  349.78   
 5  113.06  84.46    401.52  375.64   
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